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fMRIRace models have been used to explain perceptual, motor and oculomotor decisions. Here we developed a
race model to explain how human subjects select actions when there are no overt rewards and no external
cues to specify which action to make. Critically, we were able to estimate the cumulative activity of neuronal
decision-units for selected and non-selected actions. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
to test for regional brain activity that correlated with the predictions of this race model. Activity in the pre-
SMA, cingulate motor and premotor areas correlated with prospective selection between responses
according to the race model. Activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex did not correlate with the race model,
even though this area was active during action selection. This activity related to the degree to which
individuals switched between alternative actions. Crucially, a follow-up experiment showed that it was not
present on the ﬁrst trial. Taken together, these results suggest that the lateral prefrontal cortex is not the
source for the generation of action. It is more likely that it is involved in switching to alternatives or
monitoring previous actions. Thus, our experiment shows the power of the race model in distinguishing the
contribution of different areas in the selection of action.iences Unit, 15 Chaucer Road,
. Rowe).
license. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license. Race models can account for many behavioural, perceptual and
oculomotor decisions (Carpenter and McDonald, 2006; Gold and
Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998) based on trial to trial
variations in a race between alternative responses. In racemodels, and
related drift diffusion models, activity of neuronal decision-units rises
from baseline to a threshold that represents commitment to a
response (Churchland et al., 2008; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002;
Yang and Shadlen, 2007). Here we apply a race model to action
selection when there were no overt rewards and no external stimulus
to specify ‘correct’ actions. There are two lines of neurophysiological
evidence to suggest that race models are relevant to decisions of this
sort. Firstly, if monkeys are taught to base their decision on the
direction of coherently moving dots, accumulating neuronal activity is
found that reﬂects the decision even when there is no coherent
motion and both choices are equally rewarded (Churchland et al.,
2008; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002.). Secondly, the decision threshold
for a selected action is constant, whether or not it is speciﬁcally cued.
Here we developed a race model and used fMRI to identify brain
activations that reﬂect parameters of this model (see Fig. 1 and
Methods). In our model, action selection emerges from the race be-
tween competitive decision-units, each associatedwith distinct actionschemas for permitted responses (Norman and Shallice, 1980). Motor
decision-unit activity rises from baseline to response threshold with a
Gaussian rate distribution. Based on the parameters of these decision
units, we estimated accumulated metabolic activity (EAA) for each
trial. The trial-by-trial estimates of EAA informed the analysis of fMRI
data. Critically, wewere able to estimate the total demands of both the
‘winner’ and ‘losers’ of the race, using the Inverse Mills Ratio for
truncated Gaussian distributions (losers are truncated by the ‘winner’
reaching the response threshold).
We chose a task that has frequently been used in the human
imaging literature, with reproducible data on the brain regions that
are involved. Human participants chose between manual responses
where there were no overt rewards and there was no external
stimulus to guide one action rather than another. This is associated
with reproducible differential activation of dorsal prefrontal cortex,
the pre-SMA and the intra-parietal cortex (Deiber et al., 1991;
Forstmann et al., 2008; Frith et al., 1991; Rowe et al., 2005, 2008).
However, the different roles of these regions are less well understood
and activations may arise because of different cognitive operations
even within such an apparently simple task (Lau et al, 2004).
Therefore, our fMRI analysis also included a categorical term that
distinguished speciﬁed from selected responses, in addition to the
EAA that is related to trial to trial variation in response decisions. This
approach allows us to distinguish the selection between action
schemas from other processes which, although temporally associated
Fig. 1. (A) The task required subjects to perform a speciﬁed button press (Speciﬁed condition) as indicated by a single dot above the corresponding ﬁnger of a picture of a hand, or to
choose one of the four the possible button responses (Chosen condition). (B, C) schematic representations of the skewed distribution of reaction times (RT), arising from the
Gaussian distribution of speed of response. A response results from a decision processor drifting between baseline activity 0 and a threshold θ. The estimated accumulated activity
(EAA, grey shading) above baseline in the racemodel is a function of the threshold and RT and can be estimated for winners (EAAw) and losers (EAAL) in the race (seeMethods). With
four decision units drifting to threshold with a common underlying Gaussian distribution, the winner is the one at the faster (left) hand end of the rate distribution (upper black dot)
whereas the other three losing decision units on this trial are at slower points on the rate distribution (lower three black dots). (D) Schematic representation of total EAA in relation
to RT. The EAA for speciﬁed responses is linearly associated with the RT in the race model (dotted line). For chosen responses, the EAA is a non-linear function of RT (solid line),
approximating the value for speciﬁed trials at very short and very long RTs, but greater than speciﬁed trials for intermediate RTs. The precise shape of this non-linear relationship
depends on the subject-speciﬁc values of mean 1/RT and its variance. The effect of a categorical difference between trial types, due to an additional non-race ‘choice’ process, is
illustrated by dashed lines.
889J.B. Rowe et al. / NeuroImage 51 (2010) 888–896with selection, are not the mechanism of selection itself e.g. memory
or monitoring of recent responses to modulate future response se-
lection. Because these occur over a series of trials, we also performed a
second study in which we measured activity for action selection on
the ﬁrst trial alone. Activity on this trial must reﬂect selection rather
than memory.
The present study had three aims. The ﬁrst aim was to test the
application of the race model to the selection of human manual
responses when multiple responses are permitted. The second aim
was to see whether it can distinguish between the contributions of
different cortical areas to response selection. The ﬁnal aim was to
understand how selection on one trial is inﬂuenced by the context of
recent actions.
Methods
Subjects and task
For the ﬁrst study, twenty healthy adults participated (age range
19–40, mean 26 years, 10 men). For the second study, ﬁfty seven
subjects participated (range 18–75, mean 43 years, 31 males). Nonehad a history of signiﬁcant neurological or psychiatric illness. The
studies were given a favourable opinion by the local Research Ethics
Committee and participants gave written informed consent.
The task is at ﬁrst glance simple: subjectsmade button presseswith
one of four ﬁngers of the right hand. In the main study, for a third of
trials, a response was ‘speciﬁed’ in time and position by a ﬁlled in dot
above the picture of a hand for 1 s (Speciﬁed condition). On another
third of trials, the subjects chosewhich ﬁnger to press, in response to a
similar visual cue in which all circles were ﬁlled in for 1 s (Chosen
condition). See Fig. 1 for example cues. A third of trialswere ‘null’ trials
which included continuous presentation of the hand picture with no
change in colour of the dots. The trial order was randomised, and
stimulus onset asynchrony was 2.5 s. For the subsidiary study, the
stimuli were similar, and the ﬁrst response was either chosen or
speciﬁed as above. Subsequent trials however differed for some
subjects in termsof the trial order, being either blocked or randomised.
Despite the apparent simplicity of the task, we were speciﬁc in the
supplementary instructions during training and immediately prior to
scanning. For the Chosen condition, subjects were asked to “make a
fresh choice on each trial using any of the four buttons, regardless of
what you have done before”. We did not ask participants to make a
890 J.B. Rowe et al. / NeuroImage 51 (2010) 888–896random sequence, since this can have the paradoxical effect of
increasing monitoring and constraining successive responses. We did
not encourage or discourage any particular pattern, sequence or
repetitions: these types of short structured sequences may occur by
chance in a random sequence but are likely to be inhibited by subjects
asked to ‘try to be random’.
Behavioural data analysis
If responses were chosen at random with equipoise over four
options, then the distribution of successive pairs would be even. The
deviation from randomness can be assessed by Shannon's equitability
index, the ratio of observed information per sequential response pair
over the theoretical maximum observed information. For four
responses, distributed over n sequential response pairs (n+1 trials)
this is given by:
E = H =Hmax =
∑
4
j=1
∑
4
i=1
nij = n
 
ln nij = n
 
2∑
4
i=1
ni = n + 1ð Þln ni = n + 1ð Þ
where nij is the number of trials inwhich response j followed response
i, and ni is the number of trials with response i. With a ﬁnite number of
trials, the Shannon index for sequential randomly generated speciﬁed
responses is less than one, but it is even lower for chosen responses
(see Results). Typically, repetitions of the same action are suppressed
and switches to remote ﬁngers on sequential choices are excessive.
However, this suppression of repetition is less with our task than
when under the instruction to make a random sequence (cf. Baddeley
et al., 1998). Thus, free selection of action should not be equated with
random behaviour. The subjects' Shannon equitability indices for
chosen responses were used in a second-level parametric analysis of
the differential BOLD response to chosen and speciﬁed trials.
The reaction times were expressed as the reciprocal RT (speed of
response, 1/RT) because of their close approximation to Gaussian
distributions (cf. oculomotor responses, Carpenter, 2004; Reddi et al.,
2003). From the Gaussian distribution of the reciprocal RT, we
determined the mean (=median) and the variance for each ﬁnger,
under each condition, for each subject. These were then used as
dependant measures in repeated measures ANOVA with response (4
levels, one for each button) and condition (Selection vs. Speciﬁed) as
within-subjects factors.
Estimation of expected accumulated activity (EAA) prior to response
The mean and variance of reciprocal RT were not signiﬁcantly
different between ﬁngers. We deﬁned each ﬁnger/button press to be
governed by similar and independent decision processes (cf. Hanes
and Carpenter, 1999) for which the drift rate of the decision processor
is the main determinant of RT. This parallels previous analysis of
oculomotor responses (Bruce and Goldberg, 1985; Carpenter, 2004;
Reddi et al., 2003). Moreover, we include similar prior probabilities of
each response, supported empirically by the distributions of
responses across subjects with similar means and variances of
reciprocal latencies for different responses within each condition.
The independent decision processors may in principle be localised or
distributed in the brain. We do not specify in advance whether they
operate as single neurons, analogous to motion perception neurons
(Roitman and Shadlen, 2002) or as distributed neuronal assemblies.
We do specify that they are in competition, and that the race ends
when one of the units reaches threshold with a stable linear upper
bound (see Fig. 1).
There are therefore two steps to determine the expected neuronal
activation from any trial, from which to inform the model of inducedBOLD responses. The ﬁrst step is to determine the parameters deﬁning
each decision-unit from the observed distributions of RT. For each of k
decision processors (Dd, d=1,…k), accumulating activity to threshold
θ, at a rate βd drawn from a population of mean μd and variance σd2, the
winner d⁎ is the one for which βd, is maximum, with a winning rate
β⁎=βd* and corresponding winning RT⁎=θ/β⁎. For each of the k−1
losers DL, βL has a truncated normal distribution βL∼N(μd, σL2 | βLbβ⁎).
Formulae for the mean and variance of a truncated normal dis-
tribution are available. These can be compactly expressed in terms of
the Inverse Mills Ratio (Mills, 1955) (IMR). In particular the expected
value of βL is
E βL jβLbβ*½  = μ−σ
ϕ
β*−μ
σ
 
Φ
β*−μ
σ
 
2
664
3
775 = μ−σIMR z*ð Þ
where
z* =
β*−μ
σ
and IMR zð Þ = ϕ zð Þ
Φ zð Þ
The second, step is to estimate the expected summed activity in all
decision processes prior to threshold being reached (including winners
and losers in the race model). To estimate the expected accumulated
activity (EAA) across all units on each trial, prior to threshold being
reached by the winner at RT*, we estimated the trial speciﬁc expected
sum of activity in one winner and three loser units prior to response
time. For each trial therefore,we estimate the total EAA as the sumof the
winners expected accumulated activity EAAW and the three losers'
accumulated activity EAAL. On speciﬁed trials we equate the winner
with the speciﬁed response, with k=1 and βL=0, EAAL=0. On choice
trials at the winning RT* to unit threshold θ, the k−1 losers will have
EAAL given by,
EAAL = βLRT*
2 = 2:
To help intuit the relationship between EAA and RT, imagine a four
horse race. If the winner is extremely fast, the other three horses will,
on average, only just have left the start gate. In this analogy, the EAA
corresponds to the sum of the energy expended by all four
competitors by the time the winner crosses the line, and would ap-
proximate the energy expended by the winner alone. In contrast, if
the winner is averagely fast, then the other horses would be expected
to have also run much of the course, and the EAA would be the sum of
the winning horse (a linear function of RT) plus a large contribution
from the three losing horses (a non-linear function of RT).
MRI data acquisition and analysis
A Siemens Tim Trio 3-Tesla scanner was used to acquire 155 BOLD-
sensitive T2*-weighted EPI images (TR=2000 ms, TE=30 ms,
FA=788, 32 slices, 3.0 mm thick, in-plane resolution 3* 3 mm, slice
separation 0.75 mm, sequential descending order). The ﬁrst six images
were discarded to allow for steady state magnetisation. Subjects also
underwent high resolutionmagnetization prepared rapid gradient echo
scanning (MP-RAGE: TR=2250 ms, TE=2.99 ms, FA=98,
IT=900 ms, 256_256_192 isotropic1 mmvoxels).Datapreprocessing
and analysis used SPM5 and SnPM5 (www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) in
Matlab 7 environment (R14,Mathworks, CA). fMRI datawere converted
from DICOM to NIFTII format, spatially realigned to the ﬁrst image, and
sinc interpolated in time to themiddle slice to correct acquisition delay.
The mean fMRI volume and MP-RAGE were coregistered using mutual
information, and the MP-RAGE segmented and normalized to the
Montreal Neurological Institute T1 template in SPM by linear and non-
linear deformations. The normalization parameters were applied to all
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images, prior to spatial smoothing of fMRI data with an isotropic
Gaussian kernel full-width half-maximum 10mm.
Three ﬁrst level models were used. Model-1, for 20 young subjects
performing the ﬁrst experiment of event related intermixed speciﬁed
and chosen responses, was a ﬁrst level general linear model including
one regressor representing stimulus presentation (TASK), and a
second regressor representing the EAA, spanning both trial types.
Condition speciﬁc differences in trial-by-trial values of EAA reﬂect the
performance of the race model. It is also possible that differences
between the task conditions exist, which are not part of the race
model. Such differences might be due to effects other than the de-
cision process itself, and in order to evaluate this possibility we also
included in our model a third regressor that categorically contrasted
the two conditions (CvS: a type used in most previous studies, above).
Error trials were modelled separately (errors occurred on speciﬁed
trials only, when a subject made a different response to the one
indicated). The model also used a high-pass ﬁlter with a cutoff of
128 s, and AR(1) modeling of temporal autocorrelations. Contrast
images for effects of interest were made for entry to second-level
analyses. The second type of ﬁrst level model, model-2, resembled
model-1 but in addition to EAA, it included mean-corrected absolute
RT. This model was used to address concerns about the additional
information given by the EAA/race-model approach over and above a
more traditional analysis of RT covariance.
A third type of ﬁrst level, model-3, was used to study the effects of
ﬁrst right hand ﬁnger moves, in the second study of 57 subjects. The
ﬁrst moves were either speciﬁed or chosen, with stimuli like those of
the main experiment. However, subsequent moves included inter-
mixed and blocked event types. The model included a regressor
identifying the ﬁrst move; a second regressor identifying a later single
chosen trial (2–4 min into the experiment); a third regressor iden-
tifying a single later speciﬁed trial (2–4 min into the experiment). A
fourth regressor modelled all other moves, parametrically modulated
by the distinction between chosen and speciﬁed moves. The model
also used a high-pass ﬁlter with a cutoff of 128 s, and AR(1) modeling
of temporal autocorrelations. Contrast images for effects of interest
were made for entry to second-level analyses.
A second-levelmodel of group effects (random effects) frommodel-
1 included three contrast images fromeach subject for the effects of task,
EAA and the categorical difference between speciﬁed and chosen trials.
These were included in a second-level ANOVA, adjusted for non-
sphericity with dependence between measures and unequal variance.
Covariance components are estimated using a restricted maximum
likelihood algorithm, assuming similar effects over all suprathreshold
voxels, and adjusting the statistics and degrees of freedom during
inference. SPM(t) contrastswere thengenerated for contrasts of interest
including simple ([1 0 0 ]) and conjunction contrasts ([1 0 0] AND [0 1
0]). A second-levelmodel of group effects (randomeffects) frommodel-
2was structurally identical, but included contrast images frommodel-2
(i.e. the EAA effects that are orthogonal to other regressors, including
RT).
Second-levelmodels based onmodel-3 from the second experiment
used a multiple regression (ANOVA) model over contrast images of
interest, distinguishing subjects that had begun with a speciﬁed trial
from those that had begun with a chosen trial. For all second-level
models, SPM(t) maps were generated from linear contrasts for each
effect of interest, thresholded at pb0.05 (False discovery rate). Liberal
exploratory thresholds (uncorrected) are also presented where false
negative results at standard threshold would be of particular relevance.
To correlate the redundancy of information in chosen moves,
contrast images from model-1 were subject to statistical non-
parametric mapping (SnPM5), correlating the activation difference
between chosen and speciﬁed trials against the subjects' value of
Equitability. SnPM was preferable for this correlation over subjects
because of the distribution of Equitabilities and because we expected amonotonic but not necessarily linear relationship between activation
and equitability. Pseudo t-tests generated SnPM(t)maps thresholded at
pb0.05 corrected by randomisation and re-sampling over 5000
permutations.
Results
Behaviour
First experiment: Twenty subjects were asked to press a button
with the ﬁngers of their right hand, in response to a visual cue during
fMRI scanning (Fig. 1). Which button was pressed could either be
speciﬁed by a cue or be chosen by the subject. The reciprocals of
reaction times for chosen and speciﬁed conditions were distributed
normally for each subject (one-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests z-
values ranging 0.43 to 1.13, mean 0.73, with associated p-values
ranging 0.15 to 0.99, mean 0.65). After analysis of the distributions of
reciprocal RT (see Methods) we did not include a ﬁxed delay between
trial onset and the start of the variable decision period, or after the
decision period and motor execution. Repeated measures ANOVA of
the subjects mean reciprocal RT for each ﬁnger (factor: ﬁnger, 4
levels) and each condition (factor: chosen vs. speciﬁed, 2 levels)
conﬁrmed that speciﬁed responses were slightly faster (mean rate
selected 1.7 Hz, speciﬁed 1.9 Hz, SD 0.1 Hz, F1,19=43, pb0.001). The
difference in mean response latency corresponds to a difference in
median RT of ∼60 ms. However, there was no difference between
ﬁngers (F3,50=1.9, ns, Greenhouse–Geisser correction) nor an
interaction between different ﬁngers and whether the response was
speciﬁed or selected (F3,48=0.9, ns). The variance of the reciprocal RT
was not different between ﬁngers in the context of chosen responses
(F3,19=2.5, ns, Greenhouse–Geisser correction) or speciﬁed re-
sponses (F3,19=2.1, ns, Greenhouse–Geisser correction).
As noted previously ‘freely’ chosen moves are often not random
(Baddeley et al., 1998). Subjects in theﬁrst study did show redundancy
(i.e. non-randomness or reduced observed information) of sequential
chosen moves (mean 0.61 sd .0.14; see Fig. 3; compared with the
maximal possible for inﬁnite random sequence=1.0, and themean of
synthetic random sequences of same length 0.84; t-test for difference
between chosen and speciﬁed conditions t=7.0, pb0.001). We
instructed subjects to “make a fresh choice on each trial”, and did
not invite random responses (cf. (Baddeley et al., 1998) or (Jahanshahi
et al., 2000) or impose other rules on how to choose e.g. we did not
instruct subjects “to avoid the previous move” (Cunnington et al.,
2006) or “avoid repetitive sequences” (Johns, 1996). Although some
subjects may still have interpreted our instructions in terms of
‘randomness’, the behavioural evidence suggests this was less than
previous studies. For example, whereas Baddeley et al. (1998) noted
that repetitions of the same ﬁnger occurred only ∼10% as often as
expected by chance, our subjectsmade repetitions at 93% of the chance
rate. This was not signiﬁcantly reduced in chosen vs. speciﬁed trials
(chosen 93% vs. speciﬁed 96% of the response repetition rate expected
within an inﬁnite random sequence: paired t-test t=0.19, df 19, ns).
Functional magnetic resonance imaging
First experiment: We used a race model with four independent
response decision processors (see Methods) to estimate the expected
accumulated metabolic activity (EAA) associated with a response,
whether that response was speciﬁed or chosen by each of the 20
subjects. This estimated activity supported an ‘informed’model of the
fMRI BOLD response. Thus, chosen responses emerge from the same
essential competitive neuronal action schema as speciﬁed responses,
without invoking a ‘selection module’. The activity of these action
schemas reﬂect prospective action selection decisions, related non-
linearly to RT. The EAA on each trial under the race model was cor-
related with activation in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
Table 1
Areas in which voxelwise activation was greater in chosen than speciﬁed responses
(FDR pb0.05) excluding regions with a trend towards correlation with the race model
(mask threshold pb0.05 unc), reporting peaks separated by 15 mm or more (likely
Brodmann's areas in parentheses).
Region (Brodmann area) t x y z
Inferior frontal gyrus (45) 4.93 48 20 4
Fronto-polar cortex (10) 5.03 −40 52 12
3.23 24 46 28
Middle frontal gyrus (46) 4.97 −34 44 14
3.65 38 30 34
3.57 38 16 50
3.23 24 46 28
Medial prefrontal cortex 4.62 8 24 42
Anterior cingulate 4.54 2 32 24
Superior frontal gyrus 4.56 14 4 66
3.59 −16 6 64
Orbitofrontal/polar cortex 3.98 20 52 −12
Angular gyrus 4.96 60 −40 48
Insula 5.15 32 28 −6
4.89 −30 16 −12
Intra-parietal cortex 3.81 −34 −46 36
Precuneus 4.31 14 −64 42
3.84 −10 −66 38
Prestriate cortex 3.84 32 −80 −10
Midbrain (nigra) 3.59 −4 −14 −14
892 J.B. Rowe et al. / NeuroImage 51 (2010) 888–896supplementary motor area (SMA) and premotor cortex, and other
regions shown in Fig. 2 and listed in Table 1, but not mid- or rostral-
prefrontal cortex. These results were not substantially altered by the
ﬁrst level inclusion of reaction times in addition to EAA (Supplemen-
tary Fig. S1).
Our model also included a categorical parametric modulator of
responses, deﬁning the difference between the chosen and speciﬁed
conditions. Such a categorical difference might represent the mon-
itoring of responses before or after they are chosen, transient activations
in working memory for prior moves, or switches from habitual to non-
habitual responses. This categorical term was associated with greater
activation of rostral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex bilaterally (see
Fig. 2 and Table 2). It is possible that a region may contribute to both
types of processes — prospective action selection decisions and
categorical task differences. We therefore performed a conjunction
analysis of regions associatedwith both the decision-makingmodel and
a categorical difference. Only the ACC showed such joint activation
(Table 3).
If the categorical difference between conditions reﬂected the
monitoring of the sequence of actions made, then this would permit a
greater local contextual constraint on the selection process. Such
temporally deﬁned constraints are not explicit, but might nonetheless
alter the deviations from the expected pattern of choices under
random behaviours. We therefore correlated activity associated with
chosen vs. speciﬁed responses against the subjects' mean observed
information of chosen responses. A single region in right dorsolateral
PFC (40, 26, 42, t=5.36, FDR pb0.05) correlated with the subjects'
Equitability indices (see Fig. 3). No voxels showed the reverse
correlation (pb0.05 FDR or pb0.001 unc).
Second experiment: If the categorical difference between chosen
and speciﬁed responses (in lateral prefrontal cortex) was related to
monitoring or switching, then this should not appear in the very ﬁrst
response, even if chosen. In a second analysis of a larger cohort of 57
subjects (see Methods) we therefore examined the very ﬁrst response.
The very ﬁrst move of the experiment (both chosen and speciﬁed vs.
baseline) was associated with activation of left motor cortex andFig. 2. Activations associated with the predicted estimated accumulated activity under the ra
from the ﬁrst experiment. Activations (pb0.05, FDR) are illustrated as rendered in a represbilateral ventral striatum and left ventral and dorsal premotor cortex,
SMA and cingulate cortex, insula and cerebellum (pb0.05 FDR, Fig. 4A).
First moves in comparison with later moves were associated with
greater activation of the ventral striatum bilaterally (pb0.05, FDR,
Fig. 4B).
The contrast of Chosen vs. Speciﬁed trials (all trials included)
revealed activation of dorsal, polar and ventral prefrontal cortex
(pb0.05 FDR Fig. 4C). Even single chosen vs. single speciﬁed trials mid-
way through the experiment were associated with activation of polar
and ventral prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex (pb0.05 FDR)
reproducing previous studies that use a standard categorical contrastce model (left) and a categorical distinction between choice and speciﬁed trials (right),
entative brain in standard anatomic space.
Table 2
Areas in which voxelwise activity correlated with the predictions of the race model
(FDR pb0.05) excluding voxels with a trend towards a categorical distinction between
chosen and speciﬁed trials (mask threshold pb0.05 uncorrected), reporting peaks
separated by 15 mm or more.
Region t x y z
Sup. Frontal sulcus (caudal) 4.72 30 −2 48
Inf. Frontal gyrus (caudal) 3.79 60 14 30
Dorsal premotor cortex 3.86 −30 −8 48
3.64 −28 −22 64
3.20 28 −16 62
Ventral premotor cortex 3.48 −54 0 30
Motor cortex 3.72 −40 −28 48
3.90 46 −28 48
Anterior cingulate 3.63 −4 4 34
Cingulate 4.27 −6 0 50
3.85 −6 −16 50
3.86 10 −8 48
3.28 8 −24 48
SMA 3.65 6 −4 64
Sensory cortex 3.84 −64 −24 40
3.98 34 −42 48
3.35 −34 −36 62
Lateral pons 4.70 10 −26 −24
4.21 −8 −26 −24
Superior temporal gyrus 3.91 68 −42 18
Lingual gyrus 3.98 22 −50 2
Prestriate cortex 3.87 22 −60 16
Fusiform gyrus 3.98 −38 −44 −28
Gyrus recti 3.80 4 20 −16
Thalamus 3.67 14 −20 6
3.65 4 −22 2
Middle Occipital gyrus 3.48 42 −76 24
3.34 −38 −84 22
893J.B. Rowe et al. / NeuroImage 51 (2010) 888–896of Chosen vs. Speciﬁed responses, despite the potential low power of
single trial regressors. However, in no prefrontal regions associated
with chosen vs. speciﬁed trials, was there a signiﬁcant difference
between subjects choosing their ﬁrst move and subjects performing a
speciﬁed ﬁrst move. For subjects choosing on their ﬁrst move, there is
no signiﬁcant activation of mid or rostral prefrontal cortex even at
pb0.01 uncorrected (Fig. 4D). These results suggest that the lateral
and polar prefrontal cortex does not play a signiﬁcant role in the
voluntary selection of ﬁrst moves, despite their role in the selection of
later moves.Discussion
Race models have effectively captured a variety of behavioural,
perceptual and oculomotor decision-making processes (Carpenter
and McDonald, 2006; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff and Rouder,
1998). For the analysis of fMRI, reaction times and other behavioural
phenomena, race models have several advantages over simpler
analysis of RT covariance or other methods to study action selection.
They offer a parsimonious, generic and neurobiologically plausible
mechanism by which actions can be selected on the basis of either a
cued single action (speciﬁed) or a cued choice between actions. The
models are strengthened by evidence of the neurophysiological
properties of single neurons in perceptual and motor decision tasks.Table 3
Areas in which voxelwise activity correlated with both the predictions of the race
model (FDR pb0.05) and a categorical distinction between chosen and speciﬁed trials
(FDR pb0.05).
Region(Brodmann area) t x y z
Paracingulate/pre-SMA 5.29 −6 12 48
4.47 10 12 44One can account for the distributions of RT with few parameters. In
our case just two parameters were used to describe the Gaussian
distributions of reciprocal RT across a group of subjects for this task
while other tasks with complex cognitive andmotivational factors can
nonetheless be described efﬁciently by a small set of parameters. For
action selection, the competitive race model also explains the absence
of a longer RT when responses are selected rather than speciﬁed.
The analysis of our neuroimaging data based on the predictions of
the race model revealed a clear distinction between the role of lateral
prefrontal cortex and the roles of the premotor, motor, pre-SMA and
cingulate cortex during action selection. The prefrontal cortex was
associated with subject-speciﬁc bias towards switching to alternative
sequential responses, and manifested within subjects as a categorical
difference between chosen and speciﬁed responses. In contrast, the
premotor, motor, pre-SMA and cingulate cortex were associated with
prospective selection of responses, emerging from competition
between action schemas. This distinction was conﬁrmed by the
analysis of selection of very ﬁrst actions for which there was no
monitoring or switching, and no activation of lateral prefrontal cortex.
A similar distinction between lateral prefrontal cortex and the pre-
SMA in voluntary action selection has been proposed previously (Lau
et al., 2004). We suggest the race model as a candidate mechanism for
such action selection, and extend this role to regions outside of the
pre-SMA.
Importantly, our model included the same action schemas and
same decision thresholds for both speciﬁed and chosen actions,
without intercalating a modular selection process on choice trials.
Despite the simplicity of the model, it explains key behavioural
phenomena e.g. why the choice between actions adds little to reaction
times (compared with a speciﬁed action) and may even result in
shorter choice reaction times. It is also consistent with the earlier
activations of pre-SMA for internally vs. externally generated moves
(Cunnington et al., 2006). Moreover, the race model's identiﬁcation of
the pre-SMA as a component of prospective and competitive action
selection is consistent with the observation that awareness of the
chosen action may follow neurophysiological evidence of action
selection, not precede it (Libet et al., 1983; Matsuhashi and Hallett,
2008) and does so in proportion to activity in pre-SMA and cingulate
cortex (Lau et al., 2006).
We chose the action selection task because there are no explicit,
implied or prospective differences in rewards associated with one or
other chosen actions. In other tasks, where such differential rewards
are known to subjects (Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004; Seymour et al.,
2007 ; Seymour et al., 2004; Yang and Shadlen, 2007) or are likely
(Daw et al., 2006; Dickhaut et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2005), then
neuroeconomic theory and reward predictions can explain human
choices. Moreover, there is evidence for a role of cingulate cortex in
reward-based action decisions (Croxson et al., 2009; Rudebeck et al.,
2008; Walton et al., 2007). This may be relevant even on trials in
which one chooses between actions of a priori equal outcome (Walton
et al., 2004). In this case, the context of recent differential rewards
(feedback) is important since one interpretation is that subjects
continue to engage in the assessment of the consequences of each
choice, even when the equality of outcomewas known for the current
trial (Walton et al., 2004).
In our task, there was no difference in reward between responses
during instruction, training or execution. However, there are at least
twoways inwhich rewardsmay have contributed to our task. The ﬁrst
is a value associatedwith exploratorymoves (Dawet al., 2006) such as
the single ﬁrst move in our second experiment. This ﬁrst move was
indeed associated with greater activation of the ventral striatum,
which correlates with the value of upcoming actions (Morris et al.,
2006) (Fig. 4), but this is unable to explain selection-associated cortical
activation on later trials. The second is a possible implicit reward based
on a self generated rule to match or non-match a previous response.
However, an implicit reward according to adherence to a switch rule
Fig. 3. The categorical difference between chosen and speciﬁed trials (model-1) correlates with the redundancy of observed information for chosen trials (Shannon's index) in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (pb0.05 corrected). Subjects with more activity here showed greater dependency on previous moves when ‘choosing’ an action.
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cortical activations on ﬁrst trials (second experiment).
Nonetheless, a generalised race model could incorporate differen-
tial values for each action (e.g. as learned or speculative action–
reward associations) through reward-based bias of the race. The bias
can either alter the baseline activity or rate of drift of competing
action schemas. Indeed, our distinction between speciﬁed and chosen
responses is an extreme case of such differential reward, since in the
speciﬁed condition only the one action is ‘correct’. In our model, this
difference between the correct and other responses is modelled as a
difference in drift rates from baseline to threshold. We conclude
therefore that while the race model is compatible with reward-based
accounts of action selection, differential rewards are not necessary to
select responses within a race model. The race model provides a
mechanism by which a response can be chosen even when there is no
difference in value of the alternatives.
The race between action schemas did not account for activation of
lateral prefrontal cortex in choice trials. It is possible that the observed
lateral prefrontal cortical activity reﬂects greater attention to action
(Rowe et al., 2002) or attention to the selection of action (Lau et al.,
2004). However, differential attention would not explain the lack of
lateral prefrontal activation for ﬁrst chosen moves. Another possible
role of the lateral prefrontal cortex is working memory or monitoring
of sequential responses, providing a context for the next move.
Monitoring has been associated with activation of dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (Petrides, 2000). Previous studies have considered
the potential confounding effects of working memory on choice tasks
(Taylor et al., 2008; Lau et al., 2004). The medial frontal cortexFig. 4. SPM(t) maps based on contrasts from the second experiment. (A) The very ﬁrst mov
striatum, left ventral premotor cortex and dorsal premotor cortex, insula, SMA and cingula
speciﬁed and chosen) the ventral striatum is signiﬁcantly more active bilaterally (pb0.05
activation of dorsal, polar and ventral prefrontal cortex (pb0.05 FDR). (D) In none of thes
difference between subjects choosing their ﬁrst move and subjects performing speciﬁed ﬁrincluding pre-SMA, but not the lateral prefrontal cortex,was identiﬁed
as a correlate of choice, without differentialmonitoring ormemory (cf.
Table 3 in this study). Although supportive of our ﬁndings, it should be
noted that Taylor et al (2008) studied chosen attention, not action.
Monitoring of sequential responses enables more response
switching and there is evidence of a critical role of lateral prefrontal
cortex in task switching (Rogers et al., 1998, 2000; Rowe et al., 2007).
On self-ordered tasks for example, one must repeatedly switch to a
new response. Lesions or transient perturbations by transcranial
magnetic stimulation to mid dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impair
such self-ordered tasks (Petrides, 1995) even without the need to
monitor responses (Hadland et al., 2001). Accordingly, our subjects
with less activity in lateral prefrontal cortex showed more random
sequences or responses (Fig. 3).
The role of prefrontal cortex in switching over successive trials
depends on the inter-trial interval. Imaging studies of action selection
using intervals of 2–5 s found greater activity in lateral prefrontal
cortex (Deiber et al., 1991; Forstmann et al., 2008; Frith et al., 1991;
Rowe et al., 2008; Wiese et al., 2005; Lau et al., 2004). One study did
not report activity of lateral prefrontal cortex (Cunnington et al.,
2002) but in that paradigm the long intertrial intervals (8 to 24 s)may
critically reduce the monitoring of prior moves and the switch to
alternatives. In this context it is relevant that unconscious determi-
nants of ‘free’ decisions in lateral fronto-polar cortex and medial
parietal cortex extend as far as 10 s before the conscious decision
(Soon et al., 2008), thereby including the intertrial intervals of most
studies of action selection but not Cunnington et al. (2002). Thus, the
unconscious shaping of a forthcoming action selection (Soon et al.,e of the experiment is associated with activation of motor cortex and bilateral ventral
te and cerebellum (pb0.05 FDR). (B) Comparing ﬁrst moves versus later moves (both
, FDR). (C) The categorical contrast of chosen vs. speciﬁed trials was associated with
e prefrontal regions associated with chosen vs. speciﬁed trials, was there a signiﬁcant
st moves even at pb0.05 uncorrected.
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to an alternative.
Switching to new responses is not necessary for a unique single
response, and we found no evidence of lateral prefrontal cortical
activation with selection of the very ﬁrst action in the study. Other
studies have examined chosen ‘single responses’ and yet found
activations of lateral prefrontal cortex (Desmond et al., 1998; Natha-
niel-James and Frith, 2002) but a critical factor in these earlier studies
was that single responses were evaluated against a task rule or a
remembered response set: no such accuracy or evaluation was nec-
essary in our task.
There remain limitations of our method. Although the EAA is a
non-linear function of RT (dependent on the relative values of mean
1/RT and its variance) it was possible that much of the variance
attributed to EAAwas explicable in terms of a linear RT effect for some
subjects. We therefore ran the separate analysis which included trial-
by-trial measures of both EAA and RT as covariates. The principal
ﬁndings of the ﬁrst study were not altered by inclusion of the RT
covariate (Supplementary Fig. S1) and we therefore focus on the
simpler model results. However, we cannot rule out other cognitive
processes making contributing to the variation in RT, independent of
the decision units that in our model are the principal generators of the
EAA.
We adopted a relatively simple race model. This was characterised
by a linear upper bound; no delay between stimulus and race onset;
and a stable interval between baseline and threshold. These were
heuristic approximations, motivated in part by the limited number of
trials per subject, and yet sufﬁcient to test the hypotheses of the study.
Whereas other drift diffusion models with two opposing bounds are
readily applied to two-choice tasks (Carpenter and McDonald, 2006;
Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998; Bogacz et al.,
2006) our task included four response options. Therefore, like the
LATERmodel (Carpenter andMcDonald, 2006), we proposed diffusion
to a single upper bound only (response threshold) for a each response,
with the advantage that multiple decision units can coexist for model
multiple responses. Unlike the LATER model for reﬂexic saccades
however, our limited behavioural dataset did not require themodel to
parameterise two separate populations of decision units each
contributing to a given response.
Other approaches to multiple decision processes can be taken. For
example, a four-choice decision may be considered as a pair of two-
choice decisions using joint drift-diffusion models (Churchland et al.,
2008). Alternatively, the parameters for multiple independent
accumulators in a race model may vary if the estimation of
accumulated activity is for the winning perceptual units (Ho et al.,
2009). The latter approach was also used to generate predictors for
the analysis of fMRI, and the functional anatomy of multi-model
decisions. Alternatively, a three-layer neural network model enabling
Bayesian decoding of stimuli has been developed that accommodates
multiple or even continuous decisions (Beck et al., 2008). These
sophisticated models have been developed to study serial decision
processes of perception and cognition; complex behavioural phe-
nomena arising from multiple sources of noise; and interactions
between perceptual or response units. Often, the perceptual decision
is mapped directly to a response (manual or saccade). More work is
required to compare different models (Bogacz et al., 2006) adjusting
for model ﬁt and complexity, for both perceptual and action decisions.
Our choice of model was motivated by the action decision in our
choice trials, when the action is not directly speciﬁed by the perceived
stimulus. Moreover, for our paradigm and task duration, these more
complex models were unnecessary to explain principal behavioural
phenomena and might over-ﬁt the data.
Our model assumed that the competitor decision-units were
independent of each other within each trial. This is consistent with
our behavioural data, available neurophysiological data (Ratcliff et al.,
2007) and previous estimates of accumulated activity supportingfMRI models of decisions (Ho et al., 2009). This independence does
not exclude top down modulations of the decision units. Inhibitory
competition between decision units, analogous to those observed in
the visual system (Desimone and Duncan, 1995), might reduce the
activity of ‘losers’ in a race, although this reduction could be offset by
the metabolic demands of inhibition.
A ﬁnal consideration is that contrasts based on single trial
regressors in our second study may be underpowered. There are two
reasons why low power is unlikely to account fully for the lack of
activation in prefrontal cortex on ﬁrstmoves. First, with similar power,
the equivalent contrast of ‘chosen vs. speciﬁed’ single responses mid-
way through the experiment did conﬁrm lateral prefrontal cortical
activation. Second,we looked for prefrontal cortical activations on ﬁrst
moves at the very liberal threshold of pb0.01 uncorrected. We infer
that there is detectable prefrontal cortical activity with single chosen
moves within a sequence of moves, but not a single ﬁrst move.
In conclusion, we suggest that the lateral prefrontal cortex does
not itself prospectively select an action but is critical for responses
based on information in workingmemorywhen a switch to a different
response is to be made. This supports the conclusion of Diamond and
Goldman-Rakic that the ability to switch from a habit based on prior
moves is granted by the prefrontal cortex and confers “...the freedom
to choose and control what one does” (Diamond and Goldman-Rakic,
1989). This contrasts with response selection as an emergent property
of competing neuronal assemblies in cingulate, premotor cortex and
pre-SMA. This competition could be subject to bias arising from
action–reward associations or top-down inﬂuences on action selec-
tion, but it can also unfold in the absence of distinguishing stimuli or
differences in reward.
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